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Metamorphosis of the Ideals and the Actuals: Blasphemy Laws 




While a genealogical exploration of the dichotomy between the real (legal) and the 
Ideal (justice) may provide us with an understanding of the historical and ideological 
relationship(s) between the two, a focus on this binary alone acts to conceal the 
multiplicities inherent in each of these terms. Just as there exist multiple 
manifestations of legalities/realities, these manifestations correspond to diverse 
notions of the ideal and justice. And these realities and ideals overlap and conflict, 
and affect each other’s creation, transformation or transplantation. A historical 
glance at Pakistan’s current Blasphemy Laws provides us with an insight on how the 
real/legal emerging from a particular notion of the ideal/justice was mediated and 
transplanted through Colonialism and became the real/legal manifestation of a 
different kind in a different locality. 
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The topic that has prompted this exposition is significant, both in its controversial 
appeal as well as the urgency for our need to understand and examine it. The issues 
surrounding the problematic laws and notions of Blasphemy have gained more and 
more prominence of late. In the geographical context of Middle-Eastern and South-
Asian countries, as well as the conceptual and ideological context of Islam and 
religious belief in general, this issue has come to the fore time and time again with 
all its violence, complexity and ugly manifestations. Pakistan is one of the countries 
where these discourses and the problematic manifestations of laws surrounding 
blasphemy are blatantly apparent. It is one of the most pressing issues for the legal, 
political and religious discourses, both within Pakistan as well as the wider world.  
Western and human rights discourses condemn this concept and its consequences as 
part of the cultural-religious array of Islam; there are those who argue for, and those 
who argue against, the presence of this concept as a key tenet within Islamic 
principles; and, there are those who question the hazy link between the problematic 
laws and their colonial origins. This paper is an attempt towards providing some 
clarity to the issue of blasphemy and its link to the colonial history of the sub-
continent. However, there are two considerations that should be spelled explicitly 
here. First, this is an enquiry into the legal-historical aspect of Pakistan’s Blasphemy 
Laws, and not an exposition of the history of the concept of blasphemy in Islam, as 
that is a subject more suited to theological debates and is something that lies 
beyond the grasp of my current knowledge. Second, there can be no definitive, 
singular or conclusive historical exposition of any such concept; rather we should be 
concerned with different perspectives, histories, expositions and genealogies. What I 
aim to offer here, therefore, is one genealogical exposition, among a possible 
several, of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan and the Indian sub-continent. In order for 
that, I will first question the justice/law and ideal/actual binaries and subsequently 
attempt to bring forth the multiplicities inherent within these concepts. The second 
part of this paper will examine the history of the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan, and 
trace its origins to its colonial roots and beyond. 
 
The Ideals of Justice and the Actuals of Law – against the binary 
The attempts at examining the relationship or dichotomy between the ideal and the 
actual, justice and law, are not a recent endeavour in legal theory. It has been a key 
subject of discussion, not only within critical legal theory, but also in traditional 
political-legal philosophy where this debate has been on-going for several centuries. 
We see glimpses of it from the time of Thomas Aquinas – for whom human law was 
a “reflection of the divine reason,”1 a man-made mirror of natural law – to the 
natural law theorists of today, who argue for the presence of a higher morality and 
strive to find a link between law and the idea of justice. The focus of such theoretical 
propositions has primarily been to reconcile law with justice, to argue that the actual 
is a reflection of the ideal, even if in its problematic and deficient manifestation it is 
a mere shadow of its original conception. The gap between the two – the remainder 
that arises in the space between the actuality and the ideal as the eventual location 
of Being; the excess that emerges from this unavoidable process of Becoming – is 
treated at best as something that needs to be overcome, and at worst as a historical 
or progressive necessity. 2 The ideal itself is postponed, always yet to come, 
“immanent, latent” as a futuristic Totality.3 
And we live in a world surrounded by the promises of this postponed ideal, 
always told, as they say, “the best is yet to come.”4 Be it the goals of Enlightenment, 
of justice discovered through reason, the ideals of democracy or the ideals of 
colonisation and de-colonisation, the actuality stands in stark contrast to these 
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assurances of an enlightened and emancipatory future. Starvation in a world 
equipped to feed the entirety of its population,5 poverty for majority of the 
humanity against over-consumption of the few, disempowerment of the many in 
these days of rampant democratisation, the deaths and suffering of numerous in the 
name of greater freedom, marks out the ground we inhabit today. The difficulty that 
the majority of humanity faces in this age is not merely exclusion but, to borrow 
Boaventura Santos’s terminology, absence generated by “abyssal thinking.”6 He 
characterises the logic of Modern (Western) knowledge and law as a system of 
distinction in which the dispossessed individuals and knowledge(s), those on “other 
side of the line,” not only become invisible but are rendered non-existent and denied 
their reality, thus precluding any possibility of inclusion or “co-presence.”7 And in all 
this, law plays a role – it provides legitimacy to the structures of power, maintains 
status quo in the name of law-and-order, and prescribes avenues of legal modes of 
resistance. 
This backdrop of actuality and the excess of suffering, then, compel us to 
choose between two different paths. We can either take the oft-tread route and 
adopt the same approach as it is common in the legal theory and traditional political-
legal philosophy – to look at the actuality and still hope for a delayed justice, the 
imminence of the ideals of one kind or the other kept intact despite the continuous 
disappointments. Or we can look at the problematic actuality and question, 
challenge and (re)discover the hidden nature of ideal(s) we had so trustingly 
adopted.  
But this task of (re)discovery will not be painless and straightforward. The 
legal theorists of today will have to recognise and accept the occurrence of a 
Kafkaesque Metamorphosis in the past: in our theories, our ideals, our laws, and our 
selves. In Metamorphosis, Kafka begins the narration by saying “As Gregor Samsa 
awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed 
into a gigantic insect.”8 There have been literary debates about what this creature 
actually looks like, and about the semantics of whether monstrous vermin can 
correctly convey the meaning of the phrase ungeheuren Ungeziefer when translated 
from German to English.9 The issue of what Metamorphosis actually signifies is also a 
fertile topic for continued debate. I argue, however, that the key point in all this is 
not the type of creature Gregor Samsa became, neither what he could be called after 
the transformation. The key phrase is that “he woke up one morning” to find that 
the transformation had already taken place. That is the turning point of 
Metamorphosis – the awakening to see that you have already become a mutilated 
form of your old self; to discover that your actuality is far from what you thought it 
was; to realize that the ideal which you hold as your actuality, is not in proximity 
with the reality, and that it may never be. 
This is the (re)discovery, the awakening, that we are faced with today. It 
challenges the conventional thinking of looking at the deficient actuality as a 
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mutilated form of the incorruptible ideal, of problematic laws as a wanting 
manifestation of notions of justice. The ideal reflected-on-the-actual (from which we 
think the actuality emerges) and the ideal reflected-from-the-actual (the real ideal 
that is a trajectory of the actuality), then appear to be very different: the former 
carrying the image of a heavenly paradise, the exquisite Garden of Justice; the latter 
carrying the image of the earthly actuality, of ruins, remnants of a not-so-great past. 
Neil MacCormick in his paper on The Ideal and the Actual of Law and Society 
presents us with a similar distinction. He critiques James Lorimer’s assertion that 
positive law is a “relativized” form of a higher, natural law,10 on the basis that the 
comprehension of any ideal form of law cannot be independent of, and prior to, law 
in its concrete manifestation.11 As a contrast, he elaborates and agrees with Miller’s 
argument that we “discover the universal in the particular, the abstract by reflection 
on the concrete, not vice versa.”12 I would, however, challenge, and combine, both 
these positions based on the supposed binary between the ideal and the actual. 
What is required is to change the lens and move beyond the Platonist or Cartesian 
“split world.”13 The ideal and the actual, justice and law, do not merely exist in a 
binary relationship, but there are multiplicities inherent within the two. If we can 
speak about the actuality of laws in the plural, so should we discuss the plurality of 
ideals, of justices. And these diverse formulations of ideals and justice are not limited 
to different temporal and geographical actualities; rather, they can create and 
emerge from the same actuality. 
The distinction between the ideal reflected-on-the-actual and the ideal 
reflected-from-the-actual provides us a pivot, and makes the multiplicity of justices 
and ideals evident. The actual emerging from an ideal gives birth to a new ideal, 
which may be less pleasant in its appeal, more verminous than human. The term 
Paradise, which forms the foundation of this volume, provides us a similar analogy. 
For Xenophon, pairidaeza meant the courtyards and gardens of the Persian nobility, 
from which the ideal of a heavenly paradise later emerged (an ideal reflected-on-
the-actual).14 The ideal reflected-from-the-actual, however, was not as exquisite – 
pairidaeza in Persian parlance still referred to the wall around the courtyard, rather 
than the garden inside, or heaven above.15  
The ideal that gives birth to the actual is distinct from the ideal that the 
actual itself creates; the conception of justice that creates the law may be 
completely divergent from the conception of justice that law creates. This cycle of 
mutual birth and mutation is continuous: it can be a downward spiral, or a move 
upward; it has ebbs and flows from one historical period to another. The 
multiplicities of justice, then, create laws in their own image, only to give birth to 
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new conceptions of justice, and new formulations of laws. This “dance of the ideal 
and the actual” is continuous.16 
A historical account of the binary of justice and law limits us to focus on the 
excess, the remainder between the two, holding the ideal into a position of 
unchallenged supremacy and purity, assigning to it a constant messianic futurity. A 
genealogical examination of the multiplicities, on the other hand, asks us to move 
away from this remainder, from the problems of implementation of laws, from 
historical necessities and political exigencies, to dispute, recognize and (re)discover 
the ideal itself, and unmask its potential or its inherent repression. 
A genealogy of the problematics surrounding the controversial Blasphemy 
Laws in Pakistan provides us a foothold into this interplay of multiplicities of law and 
justice. It is not only that in the Foucauldian sense we find here “that there is 
‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, 
but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”17 But also that in the Kafkaesque sense, once 
we wake up, we find that the metamorphosis from humanity to a verminous nature 
had occurred long ago. 
 
The Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan 
In August 2012, the Rimsha Masih case generated headlines across the world. Masih, 
a young girl living in a poor suburb of Islamabad, Pakistan, was accused of defiling 
the Quran by burning pages containing its verses.18 Charged by a local religious cleric 
for blasphemy, she was threatened and attacked by a mob bent on meting out 
vigilante justice, but was taken into police custody. Later investigations, though far 
from satisfactory, established that she was a child aged between 11 and 16 years, 
belonged to the minority Christian community of the locality, and that she suffered 
from Downs Syndrome.19 Despite all this, Masih was arrested and put into solitary 
confinement, allegedly for her own protection. Human rights groups, minority rights 
advocates and solidarity groups denounced this arrest. There were also calls from 
international media and Christian groups, as well as the Vatican, condemning this 
case.20 It later emerged that the case was based on a false accusation by the local 
cleric, who fabricated the evidence in an effort to threaten and intimidate the 
Christian minority of the locality into leaving the area.21 In the light of this evidence, 
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available at http://dawn.com/2012/09/04/paul-bhatti-hopes-for-end-to-blasphemy-law-abuse/ (last 
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Islamabad High Court dismissed the case and a case was instead registered against 
the cleric, while Masih and her family have been moved by the government 
authorities to an undisclosed location for protection.22 
However disturbing this scenario appears, it is far less gruesome than the 
outcomes of some of the other incidences linked with the controversial Blasphemy 
Laws of Pakistan. There have been numerous cases filed in Pakistani courts for 
alleged cases of blasphemy, both against Muslims and non-Muslims, and there are 
several people in jail at present charged under these offences, 16 of whom remain 
on death row.23 Moreover, there have been several instances of mob justice where 
people alleged to have committed acts of blasphemy have been killed, their houses 
torched, and whole communities threatened and forced to leave. Challenging these 
laws has become just as problematic because of the growing conception that these 
laws are indeed derived from Islamic scripture. In 2011, a Federal Cabinet Minister 
and the incumbent Governor of the province of Punjab were assassinated for their 
criticism of the Blasphemy Laws.24  
The laws being referred to here are titled Offences Relating to Religion, and 
constitute Chapter XV of the Pakistan Penal Code. The provisions of this Chapter 
include prohibitions against: 
 
“295. Injuring or defiling place of worship, with Intent to insult the religion of 
any class 
295-A. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any 
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs 
295-B. Defiling, etc., of Holy Qur'an 
295-C. Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet (peace be 
upon him) 
298. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings 
298-A. Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages 
298-B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy 
personages or places 
298-C Person of Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or 
propagating his faith.”25 
 
These Blasphemy Laws and the instances arising from them have raised several 
debates in Pakistan. There are legal arguments against the structure of these laws, 
for instance that these laws do not include the condition of mens rea (the intention 
of committing an offence) and that the entire focus is on the actual act of the 
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offence.26 There are also issues surrounding evidence and witness testimonies, the 
requirements for which are not considered rigorous enough and which are claimed 
to favour the accusers rather than the accused.27 Valid critiques in their own right, 
these arguments are further strengthened by discussions on the origins of the said 
laws. There are scholars, both religious and secular, who argue that the Blasphemy 
Laws owe their existence more to the Indian sub-continent’s colonial history rather 
than the tenets of Islam. Conscious of the fact that tracing the theological 
underpinnings of the concept of blasphemy in Islam is both beyond my expertise and 
the ambit of this paper, I will nonetheless take the argument for the colonial roots of 
Blasphemy Laws as a pivot to trace a different genealogy of the Laws. 
 
A Different Genealogy 
Theorists who examine the concept of blasphemy argue that the logic behind 
blasphemy laws is primarily related to identity construction, of demarcating the 
sacred from the unholy. Laura Tomes writes that such laws (similar to the concept of 
heresy) are used to “maintain fixed parameters by which to locate the religious 
‘other’, and serve to demarcate the speech and practises of the other from that of 
‘true’ believers.” 28 She quotes Boyarin’s contrasting proposition who argues that the 
“articulations of heresy should be understood not as absolute borders between the 
sacred and the profane, but as rhetorical attempts to demarcate and define the 
social and cultural boundaries of religious groups.”29 These borders are “man- made, 
constructed, and mobile. They are not inherently meaningful in themselves, but 
become so within the context.”30 I would take it a step further and reassert that a 
genealogical examination of such boundaries and laws not only reveals that there is 
no permanent essence behind them (in the Foucauldian sense), but also that the 
essence, the ideal, that lays at its foundation is itself a construction. This essence can 
travel, it can be transplanted, and it goes through a metamorphosis along with its 
actual manifestation. The ideal and actual – corresponding to the notions justice and 
formulations of laws – affect and emerge from each other in a continuous cycle. And 
a historical exposition of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan follows the same 
trajectory. 
The wider legal structure that governs Pakistan today was inherited from the 
Colonial State of the Indian sub-continent at the time of decolonisation in 1947. The 
Pakistan Penal Code in force today, of which the Blasphemy Laws are a sub-section, 
is an offspring of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860). It is widely acknowledged that 
Indian Penal Code of 1860, fashioned on the laws of the United Kingdom, introduced 
the provisions of blasphemy in the Indian colonial laws. Academics argue that these 
laws were created to safeguard the religious harmony in the multi-faith Indian 
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society.31 The Indian Law Commission of 1837 which was given the responsibility to 
formulate the Indian Penal Code stated in the Preface of the concerned Chapter: 
“The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which 
it would be desirable that all governments should act but from which the British 
Government in India cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is 
this, that every man should be suffered to profess his own religion, and that no man 
should be suffered to insult the religion of another.”32 
This is the basis on which it is claimed that the true essence of the Blasphemy Laws 
for the British colonial state was to safeguard the right to religion of every subject, 
ensure religious harmony, and not prefer any one faith to another. And this trend 
can be seen to continue after the independence of Pakistan in 1947. In 1948, M. A. 
Jinnah, a Barrister and a constitutional lawyer trained in England, who is celebrated 
as the founder of Pakistan, stated in his speech before the First Constituent 
Assembly of the newly independent country: 
“You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong 
to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the 
State. As you know, history shows that in England, conditions, some time ago, were 
much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the 
Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence 
where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. 
Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where 
there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no 
discrimination between one caste or creed and another.”33 (emphasis added) 
Though the statement above is evidently a charter for a secular state, in the 
following years there were phases of gradual move towards Islamisation of 
Pakistan’s laws and the Constitution. The most significant of these movements 
occurred in the 1980s when the military regime led by General Zia-ul-Haq decided to 
support the United States in its policy of containment. To provide volunteers for the 
Afghan War with the Soviet Union, the discourse of Islamic conception of holy war 
was used,34 the ramifications of which still resonate today. In the specific instance of 
the Blasphemy Laws, the express linking of the Offences Relating to Religion to 
Offences Against Islam, particularly to acts of defiling the Quran and claims against 
the character of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), occurred in these years. This 
continued beyond the 1980s, when the punishment of death for blasphemy was 
added to the Penal Code in 1991.35 These amendments to the laws not only placed 
one religion on a seat of prominence over all others, but also started a chain reaction 
of religious conservatism that continues till this day.  
 Till now, our journey across the history of the Blasphemy Laws has taken the 
common route: it conveys that the actual legal manifestation of the ideal to 
safeguard religious freedom in India, gradually became corrupted and deficient in its 
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implementation. To uncover the metamorphosis of the ideal(s), some additional 
steps are required.  
The argument, that the said laws were British state’s attempt to maintain 
religious harmony in India relies too heavily on the assumption of benevolence on 
part of the colonial state. This assertion about the good-natured colonial power 
completely contradicts the “strong element of self-interest,”36 and the “principle of 
divide and rule” that governed the colonial policies.37 Two other perspectives, then, 
stand on a much better footing to explain the rationale behind the Blasphemy Laws. 
First, these laws were introduced right after the Indian Mutiny of 1857, for which the 
Muslims were considered by the British to have provided the main impetus behind 
the rebellion.38 The Penal Code of 1860 marked a chapter in the post-Mutiny 
legislation that provided the “decisive break with Muslim criminal law as the basis of 
Anglo-Indian jurisprudence.”39 In this light, the enshrined laws, rather than bringing 
the communities in harmony, would have served to reserve for the colonial state the 
right to demarcate and govern the boundaries between different communities and 
religious groups.  
The second and more significant explanation revolves around the role of the 
leading figure behind the Indian Penal Code, Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. 
Macaulay is famous in the Indian colonial history for refashioning the educational 
history and educational systems of the subcontinent. A firm advocate of the 
superiority of Western culture, language and literature, he stated before the British 
Parliament in 1835, “I have never found one among them who could deny that a 
single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India 
and Arabia.”40 Through his reforms English, in place of Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian, 
became the only language worthy enough to be considered of educational value. He 
is noted for thus creating the so-called Macaulay’s Children – a class of comprador 
elite, Indian in appearance, but English in intellect, reason and values. He believed 
that to truly conquer India, it was important to  
“break the very backbone of this nation, which is her spiritual and cultural 
heritage… for if the Indians think that all that is foreign and English is good and 
greater than their own, they will lose their self-esteem, their native self culture and 
they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation.”41 
Ascribing no value to any indigenous culture, literature, belief, education or tradition 
of India, it is difficult to fathom how Macaulay as the principal drafter of the Indian 
Penal Code would have included the Blasphemy Law provisions to safeguard 
precisely those beliefs that he considered worthless. What the colonial laws, 
therefore, were attempting to do was to create a class of people anglicised, or 
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civilized in every way, the true subjects who would submit willingly to the colonial 
authority. The Blasphemy Laws of 1860 were a step in the same direction. 
Like several other provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the Blasphemy Laws 
too were borrowed from the existing laws of the British homeland. The provisions 
against blasphemy derived from English Canon Law were introduced in English law 
by the Blasphemy Act of 1697. To challenge the apostates and the deist movement, 
the main purpose of these laws were to safeguard the Anglican version of 
Christianity as “a parcel of the laws of England.”42 Interestingly, one does not have to 
travel back centuries to find further evidence of this. In 1991, while hearing the 
petition for a judicial review arising from a case brought against Salman Rushdie, the 
Queen’s Bench ruled that the purpose of the blasphemy law in English common law 
tradition was to safeguard only Christianity.43 The irony is not only in the matter that 
the Blasphemy Laws of English Canon Law have travelled through different mediums 
to be transplanted in Islamic Law provisions in Pakistan, but also lies in the fact that, 
while Britain so vehemently criticises Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, its own such laws, 




Through this brief tour, I have attempted to highlight how a four-century old ideal to 
safeguard a particular version of Christianity in England became a law of the time; 
how this actuality was transplanted through the colonial control as an actual in the 
Indian sub-continent, where after another 150 years it is being regarded as an ideal 
of completely another culture, a different religion, a different time. And the actuals 
emerging from this metamorphosed and transplanted ideal are generating their own 
repressions, their own actualities, their own ideals. 
To return to the theme of this volume, while Xenophon borrowed the term 
pairidaeza from Persian, which later became a term to denote paradise, there is also 
another etymology of this term. This term made its way into the subcontinent 
through Persian and Mughal routes, and became part of Urdu and Hindi. While 
paradise is commonly used to refer to heaven in this part of the world as well, 
pairidaeza itself became pardes – which in Urdu/Hindi means foreign land, 
something that does not come from one’s own society (from par, signifying distance 
or distinction, and des meaning land). But from where both these interpretations 
emerged, pairidaeza still meant the wall around the courtyard. Perhaps the ideal and 
the actual follow the same pattern – in one interpretation of the ideal, we see 
something heavenly and we work towards an actuality based on that. While in 
another case, the interpretation is more repressive, and it generates its own version 
of actuality. The real, prior Actual however remains what it was – something in 
between. And law and justice, in this sense, keep moving in an unending cycle of 
birth and rebirth, embroiled in mutual mutilation, evolution and decay. 
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